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  Following	   its	   French	   publication	   in	   1972,	   Gilles	   Deleuze	   and	   Félix	   Guattari’s	  Anti-­
Oedipus	  received	  wide	  attention	  for	   its	  criticisms	  of	  the	  bourgeois	  family.	  But	  most	  commentaries	   have	   focused	   on	   the	   rejection	   of	   the	   nuclear	   family	   as	   an	   Oedipal	  configuration.	   The	   potential	   that	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari’s	   work	   offers	   for	   thinking	  forms	   of	   family	   beyond	   the	   nuclear	   has	   rarely	   been	   addressed	   in	  Deleuze	   studies,	  nor	  has	  their	  work	  been	  utilised	  in	  kinship	  studies	  or	  critical	  theories	  of	  the	  family.1	  This	  is	  perhaps	  because	  of	  assumptions	  that	  1970s	  feminist	  critiques	  and	  rejections	  of	  the	  bourgeois	  family	  are	  now	  irrelevant	  to	  contemporary	  debates	  about	  politics,	  economics	  and	  subjectivity,	  which	  is	  where	  most	  discussions	  of	  Anti-­Oedipus	  can	  be	  found.	  However,	   the	  social	   importance	  of	   the	   family	  does	   remain	  a	   topic	   firmly	  on	  the	  public	  agenda,	  particularly	  concerning	  marriage,	  new	  reproductive	  technologies,	  and	  the	  sanctity	  of	  the	  child	  and	  childhood.2	  We	  thus	  see	  work	  on	  the	  family,	  kinship	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  interpersonal	  dependency	  as	  still	  significant	  to	  broader	  concerns	  in	  critical	  theory,	  especially	  in	  relation	  to	  gender	  and	  sexuality,	  and	  contend	  that	  key	  arguments	  in	  Anti-­Oedipus	  provide	  valuable	  ways	  to	  unravel	  the	  myth	  of	  the	  nuclear	  family	  as	  more	  natural,	  stable	  or	  normal	  than	  non-­‐nuclear	  formations.	  We	   begin	   by	   surveying	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari’s	   critique	   of	   psychoanalysis	   in	  
Anti-­Oedipus,	  focusing	  on	  the	  limits	  of	  ‘familial	  symbols’	  as	  the	  lenses	  through	  which	  
	   	  VOLUME18 NUMBER1 MAR2012	  20 
we	   understand	   desire	   and	   repression.	   This	   leads	   to	   a	   broader	   discussion	   of	   the	  ‘domestic’	   household	   in	   the	   context	   of	   bourgeois	   political	   economy,	   in	   which	   we	  argue	   against	   a	   ‘micro-­‐’	   understanding	   of	   the	   family	   in	   relation	   to	   ‘macro-­‐’	   social	  structures,	   looking	   instead	   at	   the	   slippages	   between	   different	   spheres	   of	   social	  production,	   reproduction	   and	   consumption	   in	   which	   no	   single	   institution	   is	   the	  ‘prime	  mover’,	  so	  to	  speak.	  We	  then	  point	  to	  the	  ways	  celebrations	  of	  ‘variant’	  family	  forms	  and	   ‘families	  of	   choice’	   risk	   reproducing	   traditional	   assumptions	   about	  how	  so-­‐called	  normative	  families	  work,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  preclude	  discussion	  of	  the	  wider	  economic	  and	  cultural	  factors	  that	  underpin	  all	  family	  and	  kinship	  practices.	  Finally,	  we	  examine	  the	  critical	  shift	  towards	  intimacies	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Lauren	  Berlant	  and	  Michael	   Warner,	   and	   suggest	   that	   celebrations	   of	   counter-­‐hegemonic	   collectives	  often	   slip	   into	  moral	   polarisations	   between	   conservative	   and	   progressive	   cultural	  practices.	   We	   argue	   that	   these	   dichotomies	   lend	   themselves	   easily	   to	   the	   highly	  charged	   ‘culture	   wars’	   that	   continue	   to	   confuse,	   and	   in	   some	   cases	   stifle,	   public	  discussions	   of	   diverse	   family	   forms.	   Throughout,	  we	   use	   the	   conceptual	   tools	   that	  Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	   develop	   in	   Anti-­Oedipus	   to	   reframe	   questions	   about	   the	  workings	   of	   families	   outside	   the	   dichotomies	   between	   the	   conservative	   and	   the	  progressive.	  By	  examining	  the	  overlap	  between	  theoretical	  models	  used	  to	  describe	  families	  and	  normative	  assumptions	  about	  how	  they	  should,	  or	  even	  don’t	  work,	  we	  point	   to	   the	   difficulties	   inherent	   in	   collapsing	   complex	   practices	   into	   one,	   or	   even	  several,	  ideal	  models	  of	  family,	  intimacy	  or	  kinship.	  
—DESIRE, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ANTI-OEDIPUS Published	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  May	  1968	  student-­‐led	  uprising	  in	  France,	  Anti-­Oedipus	  responded	  to	  the	  failures	  of	  Marxist	  revolutionary	  movements	  to	  purge	  themselves	  of	   the	   vices	   they	   were	   seeking	   to	   overthrow,	   including	   prejudice,	   dogmatism,	  nationalism	  and	  hierarchies	  of	  power.3	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  psychological	   ‘fascisms’	  of	  revolutionary	   praxis,	   Anti-­Oedipus	   engaged	   with	   contemporary	   critiques	   of	  psychoanalysis	  and	  the	  social	  management	  of	  desire	  and	  sexuality,	  drawing	  at	  times	  on	   Guattari’s	   own	   experience	   with	   Institutional	   Psychotherapy	   at	   the	   La	   Borde	  Psychiatric	   Clinic.4	   Given	   its	   dialogic	   relationship	   to	   the	   ongoing	   academic	   and	  political	  debates	  of	  its	  era,	  any	  reading	  of	  Anti-­Oedipus	  must	  acknowledge	  its	  specific	  concerns	  with	  French	  bourgeois	  life	  and	  politics	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s,	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which	  gave	  many	  of	   its	  arguments	  a	  highly	  polemical	  tenor.	  Nevertheless,	  we	  hope	  to	   demonstrate	   that	   Anti-­Oedipus’s	   accounts	   of	   the	   political	   construction	   of	   the	  bourgeois	  family	  still	  has	  traction	  in	  contemporary	  debates	  about	  gender,	  sexuality	  and	  social	  organisation.	  Discussions	  of	  the	  family	  are	  not	  central	  to	  Anti-­Oedipus.	  In	  the	  second	  chapter	  of	   the	  book,	   ‘Psycho-­‐Analysis	  and	  Familialism:	  The	  Holy	  Family’,	   the	  politics	  of	   the	  bourgeois	  family	  becomes	  visible	  only	  within	  a	  scattered	  but	  provocative	  discussion	  of	  psychoanalysis	  and	  the	  explanatory	  limits	  of	  the	  ‘Oedipus	  complex’.	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  begin	  by	  endorsing	  Sigmund	  Freud’s	  early	  discovery	  of	  desire	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	   libido,	   agreeing	   that	   the	   libido,	   a	   drive	   that	   can	   invest	   into	   anything	   and	  everything,	   is	   primary	   in	   the	   subject’s	   relationship	   to	   his	   or	   her	   world.	   But	   the	  authors	  accuse	  Freud	  of	  betraying	  his	  own	  discovery,	  by	  limiting	  the	  libido	  to	  sexual	  drives	  and	  collapsing	  them	  into	  variations	  of	  the	  Oedipal	  triangle,	  forcing	  desire	  ‘to	  repress	   its	   flows	   in	  order	   to	  contain	   them	  in	   the	  narrow	  cells	  of	   the	   type	  “couple”,	  “family”,	   “person”,	   “objects”’.5	   For	   the	  psychoanalyst,	   the	  psyche’s	   relation	  with	   its	  world	   must	   be	   mediated	   by	   symbols;	   for	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari,	   desire	   invests	  directly	  into	  the	  social	  field,	  into	  politics,	  history,	  communities	  and	  mythologies,	  and	  also	  into	  objects,	  events,	  and	  affects,	  whole	  spheres	  of	  non-­‐familial	  attachments	  that	  begin	  with	   the	   child’s	   earliest	   experiences.	   For	   this	   reason,	  Deleuze	   and	  Guattari’s	  discussions	   of	   the	   family	   are	   always	   coupled	  with	   recognition	   of	   ‘intrusions’	   from	  the	  outside:	  ‘an	  uncle	  from	  America;	  a	  brother	  who	  went	  bad;	  an	  aunt	  who	  took	  off	  with	  a	  military	  man	  ...	  Families	  are	  filled	  with	  gaps	  and	  transected	  by	  breaks	  that	  are	  not	  familial.’6	  Rather	   than	   attaching	   itself	   to	   pre-­‐existing	   objects,	   desire	   is	   productive	   (it	  ‘makes’	   things),	   and	   whenever	   there	   is	   desire,	   there	   is	   also	   spillage	   and	   excess.	  Symbols	  can	  never	  be	  desired	  without	  new	  offshoots	  springing	  up,	  departures	  and	  attachments	  that	  refuse	  to	  settle	  on	  Daddy,	  Mummy	  or	  Me.	  Desire	  does	  not	  restrict	  itself	   to	   Oedipal	   microcosms	   that	   reflect	   or	   represent	   social	   macrocosms;	   rather,	  political,	   financial,	   religious,	  workplace,	   and	   familial	   activities	   are	   all	  mixed	   up	   by	  desire,	  because	  it	  knows	  nothing	  of	  discreet	  persons.	  As	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  put	  it,	  desire	   is	   a	   workshop,	   not	   a	   theatre.7	   The	   psyche	   thus	   has	   no	   need	   of	   symbolic	  mediation,	  familial	  coordination	  or	  rational	  justification	  in	  order	  to	  desire,	  nor	  does	  it	  need	  to	  ‘believe’	  in	  the	  Family	  to	  produce	  love	  for	  family	  members,	  or	  anyone	  else,	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for	   that	  matter.	   Oedipus	   is	   not	   a	   false	   belief,	   ‘but	   rather	   that	   belief	   is	   necessarily	  something	   false	   that	  diverts	   and	   suffocates	   effective	  production’.8	  Treating	  desires	  as	  equivocal	  to	  beliefs	  makes	  it	  hard	  to	  understand	  how	  people	  are	  able	  to	  articulate	  one	   set	   of	   values,	   principles	   or	   commitments,	   but	   still	   do	   things—sometimes	  spontaneously,	  unpredictably,	  even	  zealously—that	  contradict	  their	  stated	  political	  or	  moral	  worldviews.	  Put	  another	  way,	  ideological	  understandings	  of	  the	  world	  are	  cobbled	   together	   from	   experiences	   and	   activities	   shaped	   by	   desire,	   or	   desiring-­‐production.	   Marxists	   creating	   fascist	   hierarchies,	   feminist	   activists	   at	   Metallica	  concerts,	  media	  scholars	  watching	  daytime	  soapies:	  desire	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  camps	   of	   the	   ideologically	   committed.	   But	   if	   desire	   itself	   has	   no	   ideology,	   what	  would	  a	  politics	  of	  desire	  look	  like?	  And	  if	  desire	  does	  not	  ‘believe’	  in	  the	  family,	  how	  can	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  explain	  psychoanalysts’	  case	  studies	  of	  parricidal	  fantasies,	  incestuous	   neurosis,	   and	   patriarchal	   paranoia?	   For	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari,	   the	  emergence	   of	   the	   bourgeois	   family	   during	   the	   Industrial	   Revolution	   does	   have	  important	  consequences	  for	  how	  desire	  is	  produced	  and	  circumscribed	  in	  capitalist	  societies.	   A	   closer	   inspection	   of	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari’s	   critique	   of	   capitalism	   will	  thus	   help	   us	   to	   understand	   the	   normative	   construction	   the	   family	   within	   the	  organisational	  demands	  of	  bourgeois	  society.	  
—CAPITALISM AND THE NUCLEAR FAMILY In	   the	   third	   chapter	   of	  Anti-­Oedipus,	   ‘Savages,	   Barbarians,	   Civilised	  Men’,	   different	  social	  formations	  are	  described	  in	  relation	  to	  social	  ‘codes’,	  which	  make	  bodies	  and	  things	   recognisable,	   exchangeable	   and	   socially	   meaningful.	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	  understand	   codes	   in	   the	  most	   general	   possible	   terms,	   including	  marking,	   writing,	  singing,	   dancing,	   tattooing,	   painting	   and	   architecture,	   as	   well	   as	   activities	   often	  described	   within	   anthropology	   under	   the	   rubric	   of	   ‘myth’,	   ‘ritual’	   and	   ‘oral	  storytelling’.	   Capitalism,	  however,	   is	   a	  unique	   case,	   because	   it	   does	  not	  depend	  on	  fixed	   codes	   or	   ritualised	   forms	   of	   exchange.	   Economies	   of	   capital	   investment	  demand	   variability	   in	   exchange-­‐values	   and	   use-­‐values—pumpkin	   has	   a	   different	  value	  today	  than	  it	  did	  yesterday,	  and	  so	  does	  one’s	  labour	  in	  growing	  them—and	  so	  results	  in	  a	  decoding	  of	  persons	  and	  things.	  At	  the	  limit	  of	  capitalist	  decoding,	  social	  activity	   is	   reduced	   to	   a	   quantitative,	   rather	   than	   ‘signifying’,	   equation	   between	  Labour	  and	  Capital:	  ‘your	  capital	  or	  your	  labour	  capacity,	  the	  rest	  is	  not	  important’.9	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The	   meanings,	   symbols	   and	   ideologies	   produced	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   capital	  accumulation	  are	  perfectly	  capable	  of	  being	  dismantled,	  rearranged,	  or	  connected	  to	  something	  quite	  different,	  including	  social	  formations	  with	  all	  sorts	  of	  codes—state	  communism,	   national	   socialism,	   despotism	   and	   fascism.	   One	   might	   look	   for	  contradictions	   in	  principles,	  values	  or	   forms	  of	  political	  representation,	  but	  no	  one	  ‘has	  ever	  died	  from	  contradictions’.10	  Nevertheless,	  the	  separation	  of	  capital	  from	  labour	  does	  place	  certain	  demands	  on	  human	  relationships	  and	  their	  social	  organisation.	  Following	  Karl	  Marx,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  argue	  that	  industrial	  capitalism’s	  separation	  between	  collective	  forms	  of	  
production	  and	  the	  private	  ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	  production	  is	  dependent	  upon	  a	  physical	  divide	  between	  public	  workplace	  and	  the	  private	  domestic	  sphere.	  Within	  non-­‐capitalist	   societies,	   the	   household	   has	   sometimes	   functioned	   as	   a	   workplace	  utilised	  by	  both	  working	   family	  members	  and	  non-­‐relatives;	   the	  boundaries	  of	   the	  family	  are	  not	  clearly	  demarcated	  by	  the	  private	  household,	  nor	  necessarily	  by	  the	  specification	   of	   ‘blood’	   relatives.	   Under	   these	   conditions,	   there	   is	   no	   acute	   divide	  between	   public	   and	   private	   domains:	   the	   household	   is	   but	   one	   of	   many	   sites	   for	  social	   labour,	   while	   the	   means	   of	   production—public	   horticultural	   lands,	   for	  example—can	   be	   partially	   owned	   by	   individual	   labourers	   (Karl	   Marx’s	   classic	  example	   is	   the	   crop-­‐sharing	   of	   feudalism).	   In	   contrast,	   the	   collective	   labour	   force	  demanded	   by	   the	   Industrial	   Revolution	   is	   separated	   from	   the	   ownership	   of	   the	  means	  of	  production,	  which	  is	  privatised	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  capitalist.	  The	  nuclear	  household	  becomes	  the	  exclusive	  site	  for	  the	  consumption	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  in	  the	   interests	   of	   so-­‐called	   reproduction:	   ‘Daddy’	   and	   ‘Mummy’	  become	   the	   trustees	  for	   nourishing	   and	   developing	   the	   worker-­‐child—‘Me’.	   In	   the	   place	   of	   kinship	  structures	   that	   saturate	   the	   social	   field,	   the	   bourgeois	   family	   and	   ‘private	   man’	  become	   the	   privileged	   site	   of	   material	   investment	   and	   also	   emotional	   fulfilment,	  insofar	  as	  enduring	  human	  relationships	  are	  exorcised	  from	  the	  labour	  marketplace.	  Thus	   while	   demanding	   a	   general	   decoding	   of	   social	   relationships	   and	   hierarchies	  (the	   collapse	   of	   non-­‐working	   nobilities,	   for	   example),	   capitalism	   also	   engenders	   a	  
reterritorialisation	   on	   the	   citizen	   as	   property	   owner,	   whose	   right	   to	   private	  accumulation	   is	  rendered	  inviolable	  by	  the	   legal	  and	  moral	  principles	  of	   individual	  autonomy.	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Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  analysis	  of	   the	  bourgeois	   family	   intersects	  with	   that	  of	  many	   feminist	   political	   economists	   and	   Marxists,	   who	   have	   interrogated	   the	  ideological	   separation	   between	   the	   so-­‐called	   reproductive	   labours—domestic,	  unwaged	  and	   ‘feminine’—and	   the	  productive	   sphere,	   in	  which	  wages	   are	  paid	  out	  only	  to	  sustain	  private	  investment	  in	  new	  (and	  in	  the	  contexts	  discussed	  by	  Deleuze	  and	   Guattari,	   male)	   workers.11	   In	   the	   final	   chapter	   of	   Anti-­Oedipus,	   the	   gendered	  private	   family	   becomes	   the	   hinge	   through	   which	   Freudian	   psychoanalysis	   and	  Marxist	   political-­‐economy	   are	   tied	   together.	   By	   critiquing	   both	   psychic	   and	  monetary	   investments	   in	   the	   male	   worker,	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	   connect	   the	  bourgeois	  privilege	  of	  the	  male	  ‘breadwinner’	  with	  the	  psychoanalytic	  reification	  of	  the	   Father	   as	   the	   organising	   symbol	   of	   collective	   investment.	   But	   far	   from	   being	  micro-­‐	   and	   macro-­‐articulations	   of	   the	   same	   symbolic	   order,	   these	   formations	  intersect,	   overlap,	   and	   are	   co-­‐productive:	   strategies	   of	   patriarchal	   domination	  learned	  in	  the	  workplace	  creep	  into	  ‘domestic’	  life,	  and	  visa	  versa.12	  However,	   escaping	   Oedipalising	   forms	   of	   domination	   does	   not	   mean	   finding	  better	   principles	   or	   ideals	   to	   believe	   in.	   Marxist	   attempts	   to	   demystify	   social	  relations,	   revealing	   hidden	   economic	   determinants	   beneath	   false	   bourgeois	  ideology,	   assume	   that	   the	   psyche	   can	   relate	   to	   the	   mode	   of	   production	   (here,	  capitalism)	  only	   through	  the	  mediation	  of	  symbols—the	  Church,	   the	  State,	  and	   the	  Family	   as	   illusory	   images.	  On	   the	   contrary,	  Deleuze	   and	  Guattari	   insist	   that	  desire	  invests	   immediately	   into	   capitalism	   itself:	   ‘It	   is	  not	   for	  himself	  or	  his	   children	   that	  the	   capitalist	   works,	   but	   for	   the	   immortality	   of	   the	   system.’13	   Rather	   than	   being	  deceived	   into	   supporting	   capitalist	   forms	   of	   social	   domination,	   people	   come	   to	  desire	  capitalism,	  and	  that	  desire	  is	  part	  of	  the	  system’s	  reproduction.	  It	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  say:	  they	  were	  fooled,	  the	  masses	  have	  been	  fooled.	  It	  is	  not	   an	   ideological	  problem,	   a	  problem	  of	   failing	   to	   recognise,	   or	  of	  being	  subject	   to,	   an	   illusion.	   It	   is	   a	   problem	  of	   desire,	   and	  desire	   is	   part	   of	   the	  infrastructure.14	  The	   psychic	   repressions	   of	   bourgeois	   households,	   workplaces,	   politics	   and	  economics	   do	   not	   result	   from	   believing	   in	   the	   ‘wrong’	   symbols,	   but	   from	   the	  channelling	   of	   desire	   into	   specific	   relations	   of	   power,	   of	   which	   symbols	   are	   only	  secondary	  manifestations.	  Oedipus	   is	  not,	   at	   its	   limit,	   a	   familial	   construction,	  but	  a	  product	  of	  social	  production,	  reproduction	  and	  repression.	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In	   summary,	   the	  bourgeois	   family	  unit	   is	   not	  merely	   an	   ideological	   construct,	  but	   rather	   the	   effect	   of	   intersecting	   psychic	   and	  material	   economies,	   in	  which	   the	  separation	   between	   public	   production	   and	   private	   consumption	   reproduces	   social	  relations	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   capital	   accumulation.	   The	   corresponding	   alienation	   of	  the	  labourer	  from	  the	  means	  of	  production	  enables	  an	  artificial	  separation	  between	  production	  and	  reproduction,	  which	  has	   led,	  until	   the	  1960s	  at	   least,	   to	  an	  explicit	  division	  of	  labour	  between	  the	  sexes.15	  But	  while	  the	  bourgeois	  household	  tends	  to	  block	   desire	   by	   limiting	   it	   to	   Oedipal	   symbols,	   these	   symbols	   neither	   explain	   nor	  contain	   desiring-­‐production:	   every	   familial	   desire	   necessarily	   spills	   into	   other	  domains,	   and	   results	   in	   the	   production	   of	   something	   new.	   Correspondingly,	  relations	   of	   domination	   from	   outside	   the	   household	   come	   to	   transverse	   familial	  intimacies,	   but	   do	   not	   depend	   on	   them.	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	   thus	   stress	   that	   the	  nuclear	   family	   is	   a	   specific	   historical	   formation	   tied	   to	   the	   political	   and	   cultural	  demands	  of	  industrial	  capitalism	  in	  the	  West,	  rather	  than	  a	  universal	  social	  structure	  that	  might	  be	   ‘discovered’	   in	  other	  societies	  or	  within	  other	  historical	   junctures.	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  we	  look	  at	  instances	  in	  which	  capitalist	  political	  economy	  itself	  can	  undermine	  or	   transform	   the	   coherency	  of	   the	  bourgeois	   private	   sphere	   in	   the	  interests	  of	  expanding	  labour	  markets.	  
—COLLECTIVE CARE AND POLITICAL RESISTANCE While	  critical	  of	  capitalist	  economics	  and	  the	  bourgeois	  private	  sphere,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	   seem	   anxious	   to	   avoid	   opposing	   the	   Oedipal	   family	   to	   collectivism	   or	  communism.	  They	   frequently	   acknowledge	   lines	  of	   ‘flight’	   or	   ‘escape’	  within	  every	  regime	   of	   domination,	  while	   bemoaning	   fascist	   or	   hierarchical	   tendencies	   in	   even	  the	  most	   idealistic	   and	   revolutionary	  movements.	   They	   even	   employ	   a	   distinction	  between	   ‘subjugated’	   and	   ‘subject’	   groups,	   the	   former	   hierarchical	   and	   the	   latter	  more	   open	   to	   desiring-­‐production,	   to	   avoid	   mechanically	   linking	   ‘Oedipal’	  tendencies	   to	   any	   one	   institution	   or	   social	   formation.16	   Nevertheless,	   it	   is	   unclear	  whether	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  do	  actually	  embrace	  the	  ambivalence	  towards	  family	  that	   their	   analysis	   of	   subject	   and	   subjugated	   groups	  would	   seem	   to	   suggest.	   Their	  brief	   discussion	   of	   the	   an-­‐Oedipal	   ‘family-­‐as-­‐matrix	   for	   depersonalised	   partial	  objects’	   (later	   described	   as	   ‘a	   depleted	   flux	   of	   a	   historic	   cosmos’)	   is	   abandoned	  without	  any	  clarification	  of	  how	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘family’	  might	  be	  used	  to	  understand	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this	  matrix.17	  Key	  passages	  in	  Anti-­Oedipus	  even	  seem	  to	  suggest,	  as	  Eugene	  Holland	  reads	   it,	   that	   schizoanalytic	   practice	  must	   ‘eliminate	   the	   nuclear	   family’.18	  Holland	  contrasts	   the	   Oedipal	   family	   to	   ‘an-­‐Oedipal	   family	   forms’,	   including	   ‘more	  generations	   and	   more	   distant	   relatives	   than	   the	   nuclear	   family’	   which	   would	   be	  ‘more	  fully	  imbricated	  in	  social	  relations’.19	  	  The	  appeal	  to	  the	  ‘an-­‐Oedipal’,	  which	  for	  Holland	   might	   involve	   ‘communes	   or	   collectives	   of	   some	   kind’,	   is	   by	   no	   means	  foreign	   to	  discussions	  of	  non-­‐hierarchical	   communes	  by	  many	   feminist	   scholars	   in	  the	   early	   1970s,	   although	   these	   experiments	   in	   alternative	   living	   have	   not	   been	  immune	   to	   the	   problems	   of	   patriarchy	   or	   unequal	   divisions	   of	   labour.20	   Holland’s	  work	  does	  make	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  the	  critique	  of	  the	  private	  household	  and	  ‘familial’	  relations	  as	  privileged	  sites	  of	  moral	  investment,	  but	  neither	  extended	  family	   structures	   nor	   more	   ‘socialised’	   living	   arrangements	   necessarily	   escape	  Oedipalisation	  or	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  social	  hierarchies.	  After	  all,	  Oedipus	  begins	  as	   much	   in	   the	   ‘socialised’	   workplace	   as	   it	   does	   in	   the	   ‘familial’	   sphere.21	  Correspondingly,	  not	  all	  desires	  produced	  within	  the	  household	  are	  Oedipal—this	  is,	  in	   fact,	  Deleuze	   and	  Guattari’s	  most	   important	   criticism	  of	   psychoanalysis,	   leading	  them	  to	  insist	  that	  it	  ‘is	  not	  a	  question	  of	  denying	  the	  vital	  importance	  of	  parents	  or	  the	  love	  attachment	  of	  children	  to	  their	  mothers	  and	  fathers’.22	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  are	   particularly	   critical	   of	   the	   nuclear	   household’s	   blockage	   of	   broader	   social	  desires,	  but	  their	  criticisms	  are	  directed	  towards	  an	  assemblage	  of	  power	  relations	  including	   the	   family	   and	   the	   workplace	   and	   state	   bureaucracies.	   Deleuze	   and	  Guattari	  refuse	  to	  find	  their	  solutions	  to	  social	   inequality	  or	  moral	   ‘fascisms’	  by	  re-­‐arranging	   the	   family	   furniture.	   In	   fact,	   it	   is	   precisely	   this	   evacuation	   of	   the	  workplace,	   the	   state,	   religion	   and,	   indeed,	   politics	   from	   discussions	   of	   family	   that	  naturalises	   the	   bourgeois	   separation	   between	   public	   exploitation	   and	   private	  morality.	  We	  should	  not	  confuse	  the	  authors’	  critiques	  of	  Oedipal	  triangulation	  as	  a	  coproduction	  of	   the	  bourgeois	  household,	   the	  workplace	  and	  the	  state	  (and	  a	   little	  help	   from	   psychoanalysis,	   of	   course)	   with	   the	   suggestion	   that	   individuals	   do	   not	  need	   parents,	   that	   affection	   for	   other	   human	   beings	   is	   always	   Oedipal,	   or	   that	  arrangements	  of	  care	  based	  on	  some	  notion	  of	  ‘familial’	  obligation	  are	  always	  a	  bad	  thing.23	  Rather	  than	  proposing	  a	  fixed	  ‘alternative’	  to	  the	  bourgeois	  family,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  offer	  an	  ethical	  response	  to	  capitalism	  as	  flexible	  and	  dynamic	  as	  capitalist	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economies	   themselves.	   The	   final	   chapter	   of	  Anti-­Oedipus	   examines	   the	   differences	  between	  the	  ‘industrial	  essence’	  of	  capitalism—flows	  of	  public	  labour	  pitted	  against	  flows	   of	   private	   capital—and	   other	   movements	   of	   a	   distinctly	   post-­‐industrial	  character,	   including	   the	   increasing	   predominance	   of	   finance	   capital	   and	   industrial	  deregulation	   that,	   now	   more	   than	   ever,	   undermines	   the	   Fordist	   ideals	   of	   habit,	  routine	  and	  a	  firm	  work-­‐home	  divide.	  At	  the	  horizon	  of	  capitalist	  decoding,	  the	  firm	  geographical	   and	   temporal	   separations	   between	   work	   and	   leisure,	   public	   and	  private,	  production	  and	  reproduction,	   seem	   to	  be	  untenable.	  To	  what	  extent,	   then,	  are	   the	  Oedipalising	  effects	  of	   the	  bourgeois	  nuclear	   family	  really	  relevant	   to	  post-­‐industrial	  capitalism?	  	  Historically,	   the	   demands	   of	   the	   labour	   force	   have	   often	   eroded	   fixed	   family	  forms,	  even	  bourgeois	  ones.	  The	  nuclear	   family	  has	  never	  been	  entirely	  stable,	  has	  often	   blended	   into	   other,	   non-­‐nuclear	   forms,	   and	   has	   not	   always	   been	   shaped	   by	  strict	  notions	  of	  privacy.24	  In	  recent	  years,	  strains	  on	  the	  white,	  middle-­‐class	  nuclear	  household	   have	   become	  most	   visible	   in	   debates	   around	   childcare.	   Susan	   Prentice	  notes	   a	   marked	   shift	   towards	   the	   economic	   rationalisation	   of	   universal	   day-­‐care	  both	  as	  an	  ‘investment’	  in	  children	  and	  as	  a	  means	  of	  bringing	  more	  women	  into	  the	  labour	  force.	  The	  coding	  of	  the	  private	  family	  as	  the	  exclusive	  and	  feminine	  space	  of	  reproduction	  has	  been	  undermined	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  a	  problematic	  re-­‐imagining	  of	  the	   child	  as	   the	   recipient	  of	   long-­‐term	  social	   investment,	  or	   sometimes	   short-­‐term	  profitability	   for	  childcare	  service	  providers,	  completely	  divorced	   from	  the	  possible	  needs	   of	   either	   parents	   or	   childcare	  workers.25	   Rather	   than	   continuing	   to	   deprive	  ‘children	  of	  supportive	  role	  models	  outside	  the	  nuclear	  family’	  or	  to	  produce	  ‘strong	  authoritarian	   identifications	   fostered	  by	   the	  Oedipal	   family’,	   as	  Holland	   suggests,26	  the	  service	  industry	  has	  further	  prised	  open	  the	  hallowed	  walls	  of	  domestic	  sanctity,	  bringing	  children	  into	  often	  highly	  dependent	  relationships	  with	  childcare	  workers,	  kindergarten	   teachers,	   sports	   coaches,	   music	   instructors—the	   list	   is	   constantly	  growing.	   Duties	   previously	   performed	   within	   bourgeois	   family	   spaces	   can	   be	  outsourced	  so	  that	  parents	  become	  consumers	  of	  childcare	  services,	  enabling	  more	  flexible	   forms	   of	   public	   and	   private	   labour.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   technologically	   mobile	  white-­‐collar	   employees	   working	   from	   home,	   the	   corresponding	   shift	   back	   to	   the	  household	   as	   a	   site	   of	   salaried	   labour	   collapses	   the	   divide	   between	   ‘working’	   and	  ‘domestic’	   environments,	   leading	   to	   more	   ambiguous	   distinctions	   between	   work-­‐
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time	  and	  leisure-­‐time	  that	  refuse	  the	  productive/reproductive	  distinctions.	  As	  Judith	  Stacey	   has	   argued,	   feminists	   have	   often	   become	   the	   scapegoats	   for	   a	   decline	   in	  nuclear	  family	  forms	  actually	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  new	  working	  conditions	  of	  post-­‐industrial	   capitalism,	   which	   has	   also	   left	   the	   privileged	   male	   ‘breadwinner’	   both	  ideologically	   and	   economically	   an	   unviable	   norm.27	   If	   we	   expand	   the	   definition	   of	  ‘the	  family’	  to	  include	  already	  extant	  diverse	  family	  forms	  and	  arrangements	  of	  care,	  the	  problem	  becomes	  less	  whether	  to	  be	  ‘for’	  or	  ‘against’	  the	  family	  than	  what	  sorts	  of	  social	  services,	  working	  conditions	  and	  legal	  frameworks	  are	  most	  needed	  to	  curb	  the	   inequalities	   and	   deprivations	   existing	   across	   the	   whole	   spectrum	   of	   private	  households.	  Of	   course,	   regardless	   of	   real	   changes	   in	   the	   economic	   conditions	  making	   this	  ‘norm’	  viable,	  the	  ideological	  privilege	  of	  the	  nuclear,	  heterosexual	  family	  subsists	  in	  most	  Western	   cultural	   forums.	   But	   throughout	  Anti-­Oedipus,	  Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	  are	   careful	   to	   recognise	   that	   deviations	   from	   Oedipus	   do	   not,	   in	   themselves,	  challenge	  its	  normative	  structure—in	  fact,	  ‘transgressions’	  are	  essential	  to	  the	  myth	  of	   a	   ‘status	   quo’	   being	   violated.	   Claims	   that	   progressive	   social	   changes	   are	  threatening	   family	   life	  appeal	   to	   the	   family	  of	  a	  constantly	  revised	   ‘recent	  past’,	  an	  ideal	   to	  be	   fixed,	   rejuvenated,	   saved,	  or	   returned	   to.	  The	  nostalgic	  narrative	  of	   the	  nuclear	   family	   as	   a	   paradise	   lost	   even	   slips	   into	   quite	   liberal	   or	   progressive	  discourses,	  especially	  when	  those	  pushing	  for	  radical	  changes	  are	  forced	  to	  advocate	  their	  struggle	   in	  terms	  of	  a	  confrontation	  with	   ‘traditional’	   family	   forms.	  Following	  Deleuze	   and	  Guattari’s	   account	   of	   desire	   and	   familial	   structures	   as	   always-­‐already	  open	   to	   socio-­‐historical	   forces	   and	   movements,	   we	   question	   whether	   it	   is	  meaningful	  to	  talk	  about	  nuclear	  family	  forms	  as	  distinct	  from	  the	  ‘alternative’	  family	  arrangements	  that	  have	  attracted	  so	  much	  (often	  negative)	  press	  coverage	  in	  recent	  years.	  Would	   it	   be	   better	   to	   recognise	   that	   ‘conventional’	   households	   have	   always	  been	  traversed	  and	  disrupted	  by	  ‘unconventional’	  forms	  of	  desire,	  commitment	  and	  care?	  For	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  capitalism	  both	  separates	  the	  social	  world	  into	  public	  and	   private	   domains,	   and	   generates	   spillages	   between	   these	   spheres,	   as	   the	  examples	   of	   childcare	   and	   the	   increased	   blurring	   between	   the	  workplace	   and	   the	  home	  tend	  to	  indicate.	  For	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  article,	  we	  want	  to	  build	  on	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  analysis	  of	  capitalism	  and	  desire	  to	  offer	  a	  notion	  of	  family	  beyond	  the	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polarised	  notions	  of	  the	  norm	  and	  its	  alternatives.	  In	  particular,	  we	  want	  to	  explore	  the	   following	  set	  of	   theoretical	  questions:	   If	   families	  have	  always	  been	   inseparable	  from	   modes	   of	   production	   and	   consumption,	   how	   can	   these	   economies	   be	  transformed,	   within	   the	   limits	   and	   excesses	   activated	   by	   capitalism,	   to	   redefine	  citizenship	  outside	  privileged	  heteronormative	   spaces?	  How	  are	  problems	  of	   state	  legitimation	  and	  legal	  rights	  then	  figured	  or	  displaced	  and	  what	  does	  this	  mean	  for	  negotiating	   modes	   of	   citizenship?	   In	   responding	   to	   these	   questions,	   we	   examine	  more	   closely	   issues	   around	   gender	   and	   sexuality	   within	   contemporary	   studies	   of	  kinship,	   the	   family	   and	   intimacy,	   focusing	   on	   both	   the	   merits	   and	   limitations	   of	  political	  positions	  based	  on	  ‘resistance’	  to	  familial	  and	  heterosexual	  norms.	  
—BEYOND THE NUCLEAR FAMILY Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  work	  on	  the	  family	  in	  the	  1970s	  occurred	  at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  very	  existence	  of	  ‘family’	  was	  being	  brought	  into	  question	  through	  developments	  in	  second-­‐wave	  feminism,	  and	  gay	  and	  lesbian	  activism,	  and,	  as	  mentioned	  previously,	  in	  which	   alternative	  models	   of	   socialised	   living	  were	   being	   experimented	  with.	   In	  our	  own	  historical	  moment	   in	  Australia,	   the	  nature	  of	  what	   constitutes	   family	  and	  who	   can	   be	   a	   parent	   is	   still	   being	   contested	   within	   political	   debates	   about	   gay	  marriage,	   the	   changing	   legislation	   surrounding	   adoption	   and	   new	   reproductive	  technologies,	   and	   the	   increasing	   prominence	   of	   non-­‐nuclear	   families	   in	   cultural	  production.	  Acknowledging	  such	  changes	  in	  the	  social	  conditions	  of	  family	  building,	  Judith	   Stacey	   describes	   a	   shift	   towards	   a	   ‘postnuclear	   family	   world	   in	   which	   no	  single	  culturally	  mandated	  family	  pattern	  prevails	  and	  all	  forms	  of	  intimacy	  contend	  with	  instability,	  reflexivity,	  cultural	  conflict,	  contradiction	  and	  experimentation’.28	  	  Judith	   Butler’s	   work	   in	   Undoing	   Gender	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   commensurate	   with	  Stacey’s	   discussion	   of	   the	   ‘postnuclear	   family’.	   She	   influentially	   re-­‐works	   the	   term	  ‘kinship’,	  which	  she	  opposes	  to	  ‘family’	  because	  she	  feels	  it	  to	  be	  more	  ideologically	  loaded	   as	   ‘normative’,	   ‘dyadic’	   and	   ‘heterosexual’.29	   Butler	   describes	   kinship	  practices	  as	  ‘those	  that	  emerge	  to	  address	  fundamental	  forms	  of	  human	  dependency	  and	   support,	   generational	   ties,	   illness,	   dying	   and	  death	   (to	   name	   a	   few)’.	   She	   thus	  follows	   David	   Schneider	   in	   situating	   kinship	   as	   an	   ‘enacted	   practice’.	   This	   can	   be	  contextualised	  with	  her	  general	   theory	  of	  performativity	   in	  which	  subjectivity	  and	  community	  are	  constituted	  through	  doing	  rather	  than	  being.	  If	  family	  is	  re-­‐imagined	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as	  based	  on	  participatory	  actions,	  then	  it	  cannot	  be	  built	  on	  prior	  models	  dictated	  by	  perceived	   gender	   roles,	   instead	   the	   transformative	   relay	   between	   ontological	  practices	   and	   epistemological	   framings	   means	   that	   it	   is	   always	   mutable	   and	  dynamic.	  The	  implication	  of	  this,	  Butler	  writes,	  is	  that	  it	  permits	  us	  ‘to	  consider	  how	  modes	  of	  patterned	  and	  performative	  doing	  bring	  kinship	  categories	  into	  operation	  and	  become	  the	  means	  by	  which	  they	  undergo	  transformation	  and	  displacement’.30	  What	  Butler	  suggests	  is	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  because	  we	  do	  family	  that	  there	  is	  always	  the	  scope	  to	  engage	  in	  new	  constitutive	  practices.	  Because	  these	  family	  practices	  are	  always	   in	   excess	   of	   our	   epistemological	   frameworks	   and	   cannot	   be	   assumed	   to	  follow	  neatly	   from	   ideological	   commitments,	   family	  must	   remain	  open	   to	   constant	  critical	   contest	   and	   interrogation.	   The	   re-­‐imagining	   of	   family	   is	   also	   taken	   up	   by	  Kelly	  Oliver	  who	  argues	  in	  a	  utopian	  bent:	  ‘Our	  relationships,	  family	  structures,	  and	  family	  dynamics	  change	  when	  we	  can	  imagine	  them	  differently;	  and	  as	  we	  recreate	  our	   families	   outside	   the	   restrictive	   and	   unrealistic	   ideal	   of	   the	   nuclear	   family,	   we	  transform	  our	  images	  of	  ourselves,	  our	  relationships	  to	  others,	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  love.’31	  The	  exploration	  of	  diversity	  in	  family	  forms	  must	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  positive	  direction	  for	   scholarship	   on	   gender	   and	   sexuality.	   Nevertheless,	   dichotomised	   notions	   of	  family	  practices	  risk	  being	  reiterated	  in	  the	  framing	  of	  non-­‐heteronormative	  families	  as	   ‘families	   of	   choice’.32	   Kath	   Weston,	   whose	   ethnographic	   studies	   of	   non-­‐heterosexual	   kinship	   have	   been	   central	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   this	   discourse	   in	   the	  academic	  study	  of	  the	  family,	  traces	  the	  discursive	  life	  of	  this	  phrase	  from	  her	  1980s’	  ethnographic	   research	   in	   San	  Francisco,	   in	  which	   she	   examined	   the	  non-­‐biological	  kinship	  structures	  in	  the	  queer	  community.	  In	  the	  preface	  to	  the	  paperback	  edition	  of	  her	  book	  (1997),	  she	  acknowledges	  that	  in	  the	  1990s	  this	  phrase	  was	  adopted	  to	  engage	   question	   about	   non-­‐heterosexual	   parenting.33	   These	   examples	   have	   in	  common	   the	  positive	  valance	  placed	  on	  non-­‐normative	  practices.	  Weston	  does	  not	  simply	  polarise	  the	  norm	  and	  its	  alternatives	  because	  she	  acknowledges	  that	  choices	  in	   regards	   to	   all	   families	   are	   constrained	   by	   ‘[h]istorical	   developments,	   material	  conditions,	   and	   complex	   social	   negotiations’.34	   Wilson	   and	   Donovan	   also	   draw	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  choice	  is	  curtailed	  by	  access	  to	  social	  resources,	  and	  this	  needs	   to	  be	  understood	   in	   the	   context	   of	   class,	   race	   and	   regional	   inequalities.	  Speaking	  about	  non-­‐heterosexual	  parenting	  in	  particular,	  they	  caution	  that	  there	  is	  a	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significant	  difference	  between	   the	  new	  possibilities	  we	  can	   imagine	   for	   family	  and	  our	   ability	   to	   ‘negotiate	   the	   economic,	   political	   and	   biological	   realities	   involved	   in	  realising	  those	  opportunities’.35	  Weston	  explains	  that	  despite	  these	  limitations,	  there	  is	  value	  in	  maintaining	  the	  descriptor	  ‘choice’	  as	  a	  ‘rhetorical	  strategy’.36	  We	  hesitate	  to	  adopt	  the	  language	  of	  choice	  because	  it	  tends	  to	  simplify	  the	  ways	  choice	  is	  both	  enabled	   and	   constrained	   in	   any	   family	   formation,	   regardless	   of	   the	   family’s	  relationship	   to	   normative	   ideals	   of	   family	   life.	   The	   notion	   of	   choice	   has	   come	   to	  evoke	  the	  discourse	  of	  ‘lifestyle	  choices’,	  creating	  the	  impression	  that	  an	  ontological	  claim	  to	  queer	  sexuality	  is	  tenuous.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  current	  arrangement	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality	  is	  ontological	  and	  therefore	  invariant,	  but	  rather	  that	  there	  is	   ontological	   reality	   to	   desires	   beyond	   the	   heteronormative	   framework.	   What	   is	  problematic	  about	  describing	  non-­‐heterosexual	  kinship	  practices	  in	  terms	  of	  choice	  is	   that	   it	   frequently	   leaves	  unexamined	   the	   assumption	   that	  nuclear	   families	   are	   a	  natural	   outcome	   of	   heterosexual	   intercourse,	   and	   thus	   reproduces	   the	   dichotomy	  between	  the	  heterosexual	  identity	  as	  a	  natural	  configuration	  and	  queer	  sexuality	  as	  cultural	  or	  lifestyle	  experiment.	  	  This	   critique	   of	   taxonomical	   distinctions	   between	   different	   ‘types’	   of	   families	  also	  risks	  supporting	  an	  unqualified	  plea	  for	  political	  inclusivity.	  In	  Undoing	  Gender,	  Butler	   cautions	   that	   struggles	   for	   state	   recognition	   of	   so-­‐called	   ‘deviant’	   families	  risks	  privileging	  the	  state	  as	  the	  sole	  instrument	  for	  cultural	  and	  moral	  legitimation.	  State-­‐oriented	  activism	  both	   empowers	   those	  who	  make	   claims	   to	   social	   inclusion	  and	  validates	  the	  state’s	  power	  to	  decide	  what	  counts	  as	  intelligible	  or	  appropriate	  sexual	  behaviour	  or	  parenting	  practices.37	  The	   legitimation	  of	   certain	   family	   forms	  requires	  conformity	  to	  an	  imagined	  set	  of	  cultural	  values	  tied	  to	  the	  national	  project	  of	   conferring	   and	   policing	   both	   cultural	   and	   legal	   citizenship.	   This	   is	   particularly	  relevant	   to	   current	   debates	   about	   marriage,	   which	   operate	   as	   dominant	   sites	   for	  public	  discussions	  of	  gender,	  sexuality	  and	  parenting.	   In	  relation	   to	  marriage,	   John	  Borneman	  suggests:	  	  A	  simple	  appeal	  for	  tolerance	  or	  pluralism,	  for	  inclusions	  of	  other,	  already	  existing	   forms	   within	   the	   marital	   type	   will	   do	   little	   to	   challenge	   the	  boundaries	   between	   the	   married	   and	   the	   non-­‐married;	   rather,	   we	   must	  create	  a	  framework	  that	  allows	  for	  recognition	  of	  a	  proliferation	  of	  forms	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of	   sexual	   expression	   and	   intimacy	   as	   well	   as	   arguments	   for	   their	   public	  legitimation.38	  A	   critical	   examination	   of	   kinship	   and	   family	   involves	   both	   unpacking	   normative	  terms	   of	   inclusion	   and	   exclusion,	   and	   questioning	   privileged	   institutions	   of	  knowledge	  production.	  For	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  section,	  we	  examine	  Lauren	  Berlant	  and	  Michael	   Warner’s	   work	   on	   ‘public	   intimacies’	   as	   key	   sites	   through	   which	   diverse	  sexualities	  and	  ‘familial’	  identities	  are	  produced	  and	  negotiated.	  Sexual	   identity	   is	  certainly	  not	  the	  only	   lens	  through	  which	  families	  should	  be	  understood,	  but	  the	  notion	  that	  family	  practices	  extend	  beyond	  heterosexual	  spaces	  does	  require	  complicating	  our	  understanding	  of	  what	  heterosexuality	  is.39	  In	  ‘Sex	  in	  Public’,	   Lauren	  Berlant	  and	  Michael	  Warner	   link	   the	  myth	  of	   ‘heterosexuality’	   as	   a	  unified	   set	   of	   sexual	   practices	   to	   the	   public	   hegemony	   of	   what	   they	   call	   ‘hetero-­‐intimacy’.40	  They	  contend	  that	  the	  separation	  of	  public	  and	  private	  spheres	  depends	  on	   a	   normative	   alignment	   of	   intimacy	  with	   ‘social	   reproduction,	   the	   accumulation	  and	  transfer	  of	  capital,	  and	  self-­‐development’.41	  In	  this	  way,	  sex	  is	  positioned	  as	  the	  ‘elsewhere	   of	   political	   public	   discourse’,42	   the	   intimate	   sphere	   becoming	   the	  unquestioned	  non-­‐place	  that	  anchors	  heteronormative	  public	  discourses,	  especially	  those	   concerning	   marriage	   and	   adoption	   rights.	   In	   popular	   political	   cultures,	  heterosexual	   families	   are	   rarely	   scrutinised,	   but	   instead	   become	   the	   imaginary	  yardsticks	   by	   which	   so-­‐called	   deviations	   are	   measured.	   Heteronormativity’s	   core	  mythology	  of	  coherent	  bourgeois	  family	  life,	  the	  fabric	  from	  which	  all	  ‘normal’	  social	  relationships	  must	  be	  cut,	  becomes	  both	  hypervisible	  and	  unassailable.	  Berlant	  and	  Warner’s	   key	   claim	   here	   is	   that	   ‘heterosexual	   culture’	   is	   self-­‐constructed	   as	  coherent,	   but	   is	   actually	   ‘failing’.	   They	   offer	   the	   anecdote	   of	   talk	   show	   hosts	  discovering	   that	   ‘people	   who	   are	   committed	   to	   hetero	   intimacy	   are	   nevertheless	  unhappy’.43	  In	  contrast,	  they	  celebrate	  ‘queer	  culture’	  and	  the	  ‘queer	  counterpublic’	  as	  a	  mobile,	  unsystematised	  and	  insurgent	  movement,	  with	  ‘no	  necessary	  relation	  to	  domestic	  space,	  to	  kinship,	  to	  the	  couple	  form,	  to	  property,	  or	  to	  the	  nation’.44	  This	  argument	   connects	   with	   similar	   themes	   approached	   in	   Berlant’s	   The	   Queen	   of	  
America	  Goes	   to	  Washington	  City,	  which	   asks	   ‘why	  acts	   that	   are	  not	   civic	   acts,	   like	  sex,	  are	  having	  to	  bear	  the	  burden	  of	  defining	  proper	  citizenship’.45	  Like	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	   Berlant	   is	   deeply	   suspicious	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   intersubjectivity	   and	  ‘intimacy’	  become	  indexes	  for	  appropriate	  moral	  behaviour,	  and	  where	  Deleuze	  and	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Guattari	   complain	   that	   social	   conflicts	   were	   tirelessly	   filtered	   through	   the	   lens	   of	  Oedipal	   dramas	   (‘what’s	   going	   on	   with	   the	   Father?’),	   Berlant	   is	   concerned	   that	  political	   moralities	   cannot	   be	   articulated	   outside	   the	   familial	   language	   of	   the	  heterosexual	  household.46	  	  However,	   there	   are	   slippages	   in	   ‘Sex	   in	   Public’	   from	   analyses	   of	  ‘heterosexuality’	   and	   ‘non-­‐heterosexuality’	   as	   they	   are	   constructed	   ‘in	   public’,	   to	  positive	   statements	   about	   what,	   in	   the	   ‘sexual	   culture	   straight	   people	   inhabit’,	  people	   actually	   want	   and	   do:	   ‘People	   feel	   that	   the	   price	   they	   must	   pay	   for	   social	  membership	  and	  a	  relation	  to	  the	  future	   is	   identification	  with	  the	  heterosexual	   life	  narrative.’47	   Although	   Berlant	   and	   Warner	   do	   recognise	   the	   inherent	   diversity	   of	  sexual	  practices,	  suggesting	  that	  ‘normal	  intimacy	  may	  never	  have	  been	  an	  accurate	  description	  of	   how	  people	   actually	   live’,48	   it	   is	   unclear	  whether	   the	   symbolisms	  of	  public	   ‘heteronormative	  culture’	  are	  truly	  reflective	  of	  how	  people	  actually	  view	  or	  experience	  families,	  intimacies,	  sexuality	  or	  ‘reproductivity’.	  In	  Berlant	  and	  Warner’s	  case	  study	  of	  heterosexual	  people	  they	  know,	   the	  authors	  speculate	   that	   these	   ‘are	  people	   whose	   reproductivity	   governs	   their	   lives,	   their	   aspirations,	   and	   their	  relations	   to	   money	   and	   entailment,	   mediating	   their	   relations	   to	   everyone	   and	  everything	   else’.49	   Not	   only	   does	   the	   suggestion	   that	   familial	   activities	   are	  pathologically	   ‘reproductive’	   trivialise	   the	   (still	   gendered)	   labour	   involved	   in	  maintaining	   domestic	   households	   and	   kin-­‐networks,50	   it	   also	   forces	   a	   simplistic	  dichotomy	   between	   the	   ideologies	   that	   supposedly	   ‘organise’	   desire;	   that	   is,	  between	   heteronormative,	   familial	   ‘reproductivity’,	   and	   queer	   counter-­‐cultures.	  Little	  space	  is	  left	  for	  loves,	  desires	  and	  intimacies	  that	  do	  not	  conform	  to	  these	  two	  ideological	  commitments.	  Berlant	  and	  Warner	  thus	  risk	  dismissing	  families	  as	  a	  bad	  ideological	   choice,	   rather	   than	   as	   a	   network	   of	   personal,	   financial,	   and	   political	  investments	  in	  which	  multiple,	  often	  contradictory	  desires	  are	  produced.	  Furthermore,	   while	   ‘families	   and	   the	   institutions	   of	   loca	   parentis,	   namely,	  schools	   and	   religions’51	   are	   certainly	   invoked	   within	   conservative	   ideological	  frameworks,	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   being	   ‘pro-­‐family’	   is	   actually	   a	   coherent	  political	  agenda.	  Might	   it	  be	   that	  people	  continue	   to	  have	  anxieties	  about	   the	  well-­‐being	  of	  private	  households	  because,	   far	   from	  supporting	   ‘the	   family’,	  conservative	  policies	  of	   economic	   rationalism	  and	   the	   resulting	  upheavals	  of	   the	   labour	  market	  have	  actually	  undermined	  the	  stability	  of	  all	   family	   forms?	  By	  critiquing	  the	  family	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or	   heteronormative	   intimacies	   as	   yet	   another	   set	   of	   ideologies	   coextensive	   with	  capitalism,	   Reaganism	   or	   ‘right-­‐wing	   culture’,	   Berlant	   conflates	   actual	   concerns	  about	  housing,	  working-­‐hours,	  health	   care	  and	  education	   (among	  others)	  with	   the	  ‘pro-­‐’	   and	   ‘anti-­‐’	   family	   rhetoric	   employed	   by	   the	   media	   and	   ‘shock	   jocks’	   to	  sensationalise,	   but	   also	   to	   obscure,	   these	   diverse	   issues.	   In	  The	   Queen	   of	   America,	  Berlant	   indexes	   her	   chosen	   case	   studies	   (magazines,	   television	   programs,	   court	  cases	   and	   so	   on)	   to	   symbolic	   struggles	   over	   narratives	   of	   nation,	   which	   she	   then	  links	   to	   ‘mass	   culture’,	   ‘a	   sublime	   collective	   manufactured	   consent’,	   the	  ‘consumption	   of	   nationality’,	   and	   ‘a	   collective	   desire	   to	   reclaim	   the	   nation	   for	  pleasure,	  and	  specifically	  the	  pleasure	  of	  public	  self-­‐entitlement’.52	  By	  assuming	  that	  the	   ‘masses’	  passively	  digest	  a	  message	   in	  a	   tablet	   laced	  with	  hetero-­‐intimacy,	   she	  displaces	   questions	   about	   why	   intimacy,	   family	   and	   socialised	   forms	   of	   care	   and	  guardianship	  continue	  to	  be	  important	  concerns	  for	  viewers	  and	  voters.	  Ultimately,	  Berlant’s	   opposition	   between	   ‘mass-­‐mediated’	   intimacy	   and	   the	   ‘less	  institutionalised	   events,	   which	   might	   take	   place	   on	   the	   street,	   on	   the	   phone,	   in	  fantasy,	   at	   work’,53	   depends	   on	   an	   assumption	   that	   social	   institutions	   are	   self-­‐evidently	   a	  bad	   thing	   (something	  with	  which	  many	  neoconservative	  or	   ‘Reaganist’	  economists	   would	   also	   agree),	   making	   it	   difficult	   to	   talk	   about	   the	   need	   for	  infrastructures	   supporting	   all	   ‘intimate’	   relationships,	   both	   inside	   and	   outside	  familial	  environments.	  Where	  Berlant	   draws	   a	   line	   between	  normative,	   hegemonic	   desires	   and	   their	  ideological	   adversaries,	   Deleuze	   and	   Guattari	   insist	   that	   no	   commitments	   are	  intrinsically	   Oedipal,	   ‘familial’,	   ‘heteronormative’	   or	   perversely	   ‘reproductive’,	   but	  only	   become	   so	   within	   specific	   contexts	   shaped	   by	   other	   sorts	   of	   desires,	  frustrations,	   angers	   or	   aspirations.	   Familial	   spaces	   are	   constantly	   traversed	   by	  workplace	  anxieties,	  classroom	  failures,	  even	   lingering	  road	  rage,	  a	  whole	  melange	  of	  concerns	  that	  animate,	  sometimes	  threaten,	  those	  interpersonal	  relationships	  on	  which	   we	   nevertheless	   depend.	   There	   are,	   of	   course,	   immense	   dangers	   in	  romanticising	  the	  family	  as	  a	  natural	  site	  for	  the	  expression	  of	  ‘human’	  desires,	  but	  there	   are	   equal	   risks	   in	   reducing	   family	   to	   a	   false	   consciousness	   caught	   up	   in	  ‘domesticity’,	   ‘reproduction’,	   ‘procreation’,	   ‘patriarchy’,	   ‘ideology’,	   or	   even	   ‘hetero-­‐intimacy’,	   whether	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   moral	   conservatism	   or	   anti-­‐hegemonic	  critique.	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  analysis	  of	  capitalist	  decoding	  allows	  us	  to	  separate	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the	   provisional	   ideologies	   generated	   within	   specific	   contexts	   of	   bourgeois	  production	  from	  the	  vicissitudes	  of	  the	  labour	  market	  itself,	  which	  intrude	  upon	  the	  private	   sphere	   and	   can	   create	   forms	   of	   domination	   not	   dependent	   on,	   although	  sometimes	   coextensive	   with,	   bourgeois	   family	   norms.	   Furthermore,	   by	   treating	  desiring-­‐production	   as	   irreducible	   to	   the	   objects	   it	   passes	   through,	   Deleuze	   and	  Guattari	   move	   beyond	   the	   critical	   sleight	   of	   hand	   that	   judges	   intimacies,	   values,	  commitments,	   loves	   and	   frustrations	   from	   the	   ideologies	   produced	   by	   the	   mass	  media	   or	   conservative	   politicians.	   Rather	   than	   trying	   to	   fix	   desire	   on	   to	   better	  objects	  (public	  or	  counterpublic,	  the	  effects	  can	  be	  the	  same),	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  focus	  more	   on	   regimes	   of	   judgement—from	   the	   Left	   and	   the	   Right—that	   prevent	  desire	   from	   producing	   different	   ways	   of	   being	   or	   desiring,	   sometimes,	   but	   not	  always,	  recognisable	  as	  intimacies.	  We	   do	   not	   deny	   that	   struggles	   around	   rights,	   representation	   and	   the	   public	  recognition	  of	  sexual	  diversity	  are	  important.	  In	  Anti-­Oedipus,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  acknowledge	   the	   importance	   of	   struggles	   over	   moral	   or	   legal	   ‘axioms’,	   insofar	   as	  structures	   of	   visibility	   and	   invisibility,	   recognition	   and	   exclusion,	   determine	   the	  limits	  of	  political	  activism	  and	  revolutionary	  praxis.54	  The	  crucial	  point,	  however,	  is	  that	  recognition	  should	  never	  be	  an	  end	  in	   itself:	   it	  must	  always	  be	  coupled	  with	  a	  
destabilisation	  of	   the	  mechanisms	  of	  recognition.	   Important	  distinctions	  need	  to	  be	  made	  between	   the	   sorts	   of	   public	   recognition	   generated	  by	   ‘mass	  medias’	   or	   legal	  discourses,	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   symbols	   of	   inclusion	   or	   exclusion	   trickle	   through	  popular	   and	   everyday	   cultures,	   and	   the	   complex	   configurations	   of	   kinship,	   family	  and	  interdependency	  to	  which	  such	  popular	  discourses	  around	  identity	  are	  actually	  applied.	   The	   privilege	   of	   certain	   intimacies	   over	   others	   is	   certainly	   problematic,	  especially	   within	   political	   discourse,	   but	   having	   to	   choose	   between	   authentic	   and	  inauthentic,	  or	   ‘non-­‐institutional’	  and	   ‘mass	  mediated’,	   intimacies	  makes	   it	  difficult	  to	  talk	  about	  what	  people	  actually	  desire,	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  desire	  is	  produced,	  or	  the	  concrete	  effects	  that	  desiring-­‐production	  can	  have.	  
—CONCLUSION This	  article	  may	  have	  raised	  more	  questions	  than	  it	  has	  answered,	  but	  this	  has	  been	  a	  necessary	  part	  of	  exploring	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  Anti-­Oedipus	  might	  enable	  a	  more	  complex	  understanding	  of	  family.	  Their	  work	  provides	  valuable	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and	  under-­‐utilised	  tools	  for	  complicating	  notions	  of	  the	  ‘nuclear	  family’	  by	  opening	  it	  up	  to	  questions	  of	  political	  economy	  and	  desire,	  so	  that	  it	  is	  not	  reduced	  merely	  to	  an	   ideological	   construction.	   While	   this	   article	   supports	   the	   disinvestment	   of	   the	  nuclear	   family’s	   social	   privileges,	   we	   have	   been	   hesitant	   to	   support	   dichotomous	  understandings	  of	   the	  so-­‐called	   ‘normative’	   family	  and	   its	  alternatives	   (even	  when	  these	  are	   framed	   in	   celebratory	   language),	   and	  have	  argued	  against	   a	   taxonomical	  understanding	   of	   the	   diversity	   of	   family	   form.	   Rather	   than	   seeing	   a	   particular	  structure	  of	  the	  family	  as	  inevitable	  for	  social	  (or	  psychic)	  organisation,	  we	  envisage	  family	   as	   a	   continuum	  composed	  of	   varied	   and	   shifting	  practices.	   This	  means	   that	  family	   is	   something	   we	   are	   engaged	   in	   doing	   and	   as	   such	   our	   material	   practices	  cannot	  be	  based	  on	  prior	  or	  ‘innate’	  models	  of	  being,	  related	  to	  limited	  and	  limiting	  notions	   of	   gender	   and	   sexuality.	   Family	   practices	  will	   always	   operate	   in	   excess	   of	  their	  empirical	  classification	  and	  consequently	  the	  way	  it	  is	  politically	  acknowledged	  and	   discursively	   framed	   will	   continue	   to	   shift.	   This	   article	   has	   argued	   for	   better	  ways	  to	  theoretically	  acknowledge	  the	  intricacies	  of	  contemporary	  family	  practices,	  surely	  an	  important	  and	  neglected	  aspect	  of	  the	  study	  of	  gender	  and	  sexuality,	  and	  a	  project	  that	  is	  vital	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  new	  forms	  of	  intimacy,	  desire	  and	  love.	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—NOTES 1	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  critique	  of	  the	  nuclear	  family	  is	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  in	  introductory	  material	  on	  
Anti-­Oedipus.	  See	  for	  example,	  Philip	  Goodchild,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari:	  An	  Introduction	  to	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  Sage,	  London,	  1996,	  pp.	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  Jeffrey	  Weeks,	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  Sexual	  History,	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  Cambridge,	  Oxford	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  pp.	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  Eugene	  Holland,	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari’s	  Anti-­Oedipus:	  Introduction	  to	  
Schizoanalysis,	  Routledge,	  London	  and	  New	  York,	  1999;	  Eugene	  Holland,	  ‘On	  Some	  Implications	  of	  Schizoanalysis’,	  Strategies,	  vol.	  15,	  no.	  1,	  2002,	  pp.	  27–40.	  Holland’s	  reading	  of	  the	  family	  in	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari	  will	  be	  addressed	  later	  in	  this	  article.	  2	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  sanctity	  of	  the	  child	  has	  not	  been	  prominent	  in	  public	  discourse	  before	  this.	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  how	  this	  played	  out	  in	  post-­‐’68	  France	  see	  Julian	  Bourg,	  From	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  to	  Ethics:	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  University	  Press,	  Montreal	  and	  Kingston,	  2007,	  pp.	  204–18.	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  an	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  of	  	  well-­‐publicised	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  the	  child	  in	  an	  Australian	  context,	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  debates	  surrounding	  Bill	  Henson’s	  self-­‐titled	  photographic	  exhibition	  held	  at	  the	  Roslyn	  Oxley9	  Gallery	  in	  Paddington,	  Australia,	  in	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  2008.	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  For	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  of	  Anti-­Oedipus	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  May	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  book	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  Ian	  Buchanan,	  ‘Is	  Anti-­Oedipus	  a	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  ‘68	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  in	  Claire	  Colebrook	  and	  Jeffrey	  Bell,	  Deleuze	  and	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  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  Edinburgh,	  2009,	  pp.	  206–24.	  4	  Bourg,	  pp.	  125–37.	  5	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  and	  Felix	  Guattari,	  Anti-­Oedipus:	  Capitalism	  and	  Schizophrenia,	  trans.	  Robert	  Hurley,	  Mark	  Seem	  and	  Helen	  R.	  Lane,	  Continuum,	  London	  and	  New	  York,	  2004,	  p.	  323.	  6	  Deleuze	  and	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  p.	  107;	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  pp.	  34,	  51,	  250–1.	  7	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Anti-­Oedipus,	  p.	  62	  8	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Anti-­Oedipus,	  p.	  117	  9	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Anti-­Oedipus,	  p.	  272,	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  Here	  Deleuze	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  Guattari	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  Marx’s	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  labour	  as	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  See	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  A	  
Critique	  of	  Political	  Economy,	  Volume	  1,	  trans.	  Ben	  Fowkes,	  Vintage,	  New	  York,	  1977,	  p.	  128.	  10	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Anti-­Oedipus,	  pp.	  166,	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  Deleuze	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  in	  A	  Thousand	  Plateaus:	  
Capitalism	  and	  Schizophrenia,	  trans.	  Brian	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  economist	  exploring	  similar	  issues,	  see	  Jane	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  a	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  Analysis	  of	  Gender	  and	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  in	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  Fishburne	  Collier,	  Sylvia	  Junko	  Yanagisako,	  and	  Maurice	  Bloch	  (eds),	  Gender	  and	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  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  Stanford,	  1987,	  pp.	  14–50;	  Marilyn	  Strathern,	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  and	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  of	  a	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  American	  Ethnologist,	  vol.	  12,	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  2,	  1985,	  pp.	  191–209.	  12	  See	  Micaela	  Di	  Leonardo,	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  Female	  World	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  Cards	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  Holidays:	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  Families,	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  Work	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  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	  Anti-­Oedipus,	  p.	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  Stack	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